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On the morning of 14 December 1790, an angry crowd surrounded the royal prison in Aix en-
Provence and forced the release of the marquis de la Roquette and the avocat au parlement Jean 
Joseph Pascalis. Led by militant members of the Club des anti-politiques, a radical club in Aix 
composed largely of artisans, the crowd escorted the two men through the streets of Aix to the 
elegant Cours Mirabeau, where each was hanged by a rope from a street lantern. Later that day 
the same fate befell Andre-Raymond Guiramand, an elderly chevalier of St. Louis who in recent 
days had ardently and vocally defended the royalist cause from the steps of the cafe Guion. Thus 
abruptly ended the brief existence of the Club des amis de la paix in Aix, whose gala opening 
had been scheduled to occur two days earlier.
1
  
This violent episode in the revolutionary history of Aix is but an extreme case among numerous 
confrontations between radical revolutionaries and the leaders of monarchist clubs that occurred 
throughout provincial France from December 1790 through late 1791. The appearance of these 
clubs in provincial towns roughly coincided with the formation of the Club monarchique in Paris 
and with the publication of a flurry of pamphlets and newspaper articles debating both the 
legitimacy of political clubs generally and the rights and responsibilities of particular clubs and 
their members. Yet the activities of monarchist clubs during this period have received scant 
attention in revolutionary historiography.
2
 We thus know very little about these clubs, which, de-
spite their short life, contributed greatly to the polarization of politics in 1790-91. 
It would be premature to attempt to write a history of monarchist clubs throughout France. As 
the case of the Aix club illustrates, most flared into and out of existence quite quickly, and one 
would need to comb departmental archives and local histories to verify their numbers and fully 
gauge the scope of their impact. The goals of this article are more modest: to examine on the one 
hand the attempts to found monarchist clubs in three provincial towns, with an eye to 
establishing what their common experiences can tell us about the movement in general and what 
their differences reveal about divisions within the monarchist camp in 1790-91; and to explore 
on the other hand the pamphlet and newspaper literature that accompanied the creation of these 
clubs, both as an inspiration and as a response to the confrontations they produced. 
My overarching goal will be to bring these two discussions together. The relationship between 
the monarchist clubs in the provinces and these pamphlets and newspapers, mostly Parisian, is 
not immediately obvious. The club founders did not write the pamphlets, and the tone of the 
pamphlets is mostly abstract and theoretical, though there are occasional references to one or 
more of the provincial clubs and the trouble they attracted. But the founders of these clubs and 
the authors of these pamphlets were grappling with the same sets of issues: the definition of 
public opinion and its legitimate expression; the nature and extent of popular sovereignty and its 
appropriate exercise; the relationship between the government-whether executive or legislative -
and the citizenry. All of these issues were debated through-out the early years of the Revolution, 
both in rhetoric and in action. While it has been fashionable of late to emphasize the primacy of 
dis-course in revolutionary politics, what follows will suggest that actions and events in the 
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provinces - political experience, that is - often influenced the rhetorical debates that raged in the 
capital. 
Although Emmanuel Vingtrinier probably exaggerated in suggesting that monarchist clubs 
formed in every department, they were numerous and widespread. Utilizing revolutionary 
newspapers, as well as other sources, we can document the existence of at least thirty-five 
monarchist clubs (see fig. 1).
3
 They took names such as Amis de la paix, Amis de l'ordre, or, 
more plainly, Amis de la monarchie. They appeared in major cities, such as Bordeaux, Orleans, 
Nancy, Toulouse, and Paris; but these clubs also formed in smaller towns such as Cambrai, 
Tulle, and Agde. They could be found in nearly every region of France but with a somewhat 
greater concentration in the northeast and southwest. 
When and why did these monarchist clubs appear? The Monarchist Club of Paris appears to have 
had its first manifestation as the Club of Viroflay, which formed at Versailles in response to the 
20 June 1789 declaration of the Third Estate placing the nation and the law be-fore the king.
4
 
Count Stanislas Clermont-Tonnerre (a liberal noble in 1789, close to Mounier in the Constituent 
Assembly) participated in the meetings of this early club. Another source of membership for the 
Monarchist Club was the Club des impartiaux, founded in late 1789 by Pierre Victor Malouet (a 
naval intendant at Toulon at the end of the Old Regime and a vocal advocate of a bicameral 
legislature in the debates of the Constituent Assembly). The club stated its purpose in the first 
issue of its newspaper, the Journal des impartiaux: "The principal object, in gathering together, 
was to profess and publicize the prin-ciples that its members had adopted. . . , recognizing how 
important it would be that the publication of their articles should distance the society from any 
hint of intrigue or cabal, both of which were equally abhorrent to their spirit and their 
principles." The Club des impartiaux was small, numbering only some forty members, though its 
meetings were open to the public.
5 
Clermont-Tonnerre and Malouet would collaborate in the 1790 founding of the Monarchist Club. 
Initial meetings occurred in mid- April, inspired by the refusal of the Constituent Assembly to 
declare Catholicism the state religion of France. The abolition of hereditary nobility in June 
1790, and the Assembly's approval of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy in July gave royalists 
additional cause for concern. Only in late fall, however, did the Monarchist Club formally 
constitute itself, perhaps goaded into action by the 27 November decree mandating the civil oath 
of the clergy. 
Robert Griffiths argues that whereas the impartiaux had striven to strengthen the royal executive 
power, the task for the Monarchist Club would be to save the monarchy itself. Griffiths positions 
this new club squarely in the center of the political spectrum, observing that its membership 
abandoned the commitment to bicameralism that the Club des impartiaux had emphasized and 
that the club was fundamentally opposed to any idea of a counterrevolutionary movement, based 
either among the emigres or in the provinces.
6
 Timothy Tackett would place the Monarchist Club 
on the right rather than in the center, though not on the extreme right. He observes that "while 
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the Breton Club had operated in an essentially democratic fashion, with relatively loose 
discipline and public debates in a cafe to which all were invited, the Monarchiens followed their 
more authoritarian and hierarchical penchant by establishing a small decision-making 'central 
committee,' which convened in private at one of the member's homes-and some-times in the 
chateau of Versailles itself- and which then sent out directives through a system of 
subcommittees to all its potential adherents." 
7
 That authoritarian penchant is also suggested in 
an early speech given by Malouet to his constituents in Riom: "Let us not deny, Messieurs, that 
the people need more to be governed and to be submitted to a protective authority, since they do 
not have the aptitude to direct it." 
8
 As we shall see, although the monarchist clubs solicited the 
support of common people, their role was to be essentially a passive one. 
The Monarchist Club of Paris, then, formed in part in response to failed legislation, with the 
hope of influencing the future deliberations of the Constituent Assembly. To assist in that effort, 
members encouraged the creation of similar clubs in the provinces, though the provincial clubs 
often arose in response to local rather than national concerns. We can speak of a variety of goals 
and objectives that guided these clubs. Contemporary opponents of the monarchist clubs, and 
most subsequent writers, accused them of counterrevolutionary intentions despite the 
protestations to the contrary of the club in Paris. This was clearly the case in Aix, where 
instances of contact between the monarchist clubs and the emigre princes in Turin have been 
estab-lished.
9
 For other provincial clubs, however, there is little evidence of counterrevolutionary 
intent. Some formed for the purpose of contesting municipal elections by supporting an 
organized slate of candidates. A third objective of the clubs, perhaps the most widely shared, was 
the destruction of the Jacobin clubs, which the monarchists denounced as the real 
counterrevolutionaries. Implicit in this goal, as we shall see, was a denial of the legitimacy of 
political clubs. This put the monarchists in the curious position of forming a club to secure the 
abolition of all political clubs. 
What did the monarchist clubs themselves declare their objectives to be? This is a difficult 
question to answer, as few of the clubs left published programs for posterity. Nonetheless, we do 
have the pro-spectus of the Limoges Amis de la paix, printed by the Mercure deFrance in 
December 1790, and a pamphlet published about the same time by the Monarchist Club of Paris, 
outlining its principles and objec-tives.
10
 The Limoges club, as suggested by its title, stated as its 
principal goal the preservation of public order and peace. In its preamble the prospectus called 
into question all "associations particulieres" and went on to explicitly denounce those groups that 
resorted to inflammatory rhetoric and exclusionary tactics. The new club pledged its scrupulous 
adherence to the laws of the nation-far better to obey laws, even if flawed, than to chase after the 
chimera of legislative perfection and risk anarchy. On this point the Amis de la paix implicitly 
taunted the Limoges Jacobins, who had formed their club before the Constituent Assembly had 
declared such associations legal. 
The Paris pamphlet took up some of these same themes, making explicit the Limoges club's 
implied reference tojean-Jacques Rousseau, in its attack on "associations particulieres." The 
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author of the pamphlet asserted that all clubs and political associations were destructive of the 
general will. But given the existence of theJacobin clubs, he continued, it was necessary to form 
another club that would welcome honest and peaceable men. The Monarchist Club would, of 
course, dissolve as soon as order was restored and factions abolished. In the meantime three 
principles would guide the organization: (1) The French government is a monarchy; (2) the 
person of the king is inviolable and sacred; and (3) the constitution decreed by the national 
assembly, and accepted by the king, is the law of all Frenchmen, and each one owed it 
submission. The law, indeed, was the concrete expression of the general will. These three 
principles directly addressed what had been the chief criticism leveled against the Paris club: 
Why did this new club, in its full title, style itself the Friends of the Monarchist Constitution, 
whereas the Jacobins declared themselves simply the Friends of the Constitution? To this 
challenge the pamphleteer replied very simply: The French government is, after all, a monarchy. 
But this issue of the club title clearly concerned the Paris monarchists and those of like mind in 
the provinces, who for the most part avoided including the word "monarchist" in their club titles. 
The most common alternative was Amis de la paix, a title itself soon denounced by the Jacobins 
as dangerously misleading and inappropriate for clubs that nearly always incited disorder and 
violence in the towns where they appeared. 
Since it is the appearance of these monarchist clubs in so many provincial towns that makes them 
interesting and significant, it is im-portant that we look away from Paris in order to appraise 
them fully. I have gathered extensive documentation for three provincial clubs, in Aix, Limoges, 
and Perpignan. Each club forced a confrontation in December 1790 and each had ceased to 
formally exist by January 1791. All three formed in opposition to a local Jacobin club, and, while 
nobles and wealthy bourgeois seemed to dominate, each club made an effort to recruit a popular 
following. Beyond this there are few similarities. These three examples alone will make clear 
that broad generalizations about the nature of the monarchist clubs are risky propositions. 
The club in Aix was among the earliest of the monarchist clubs to appear and among the earliest 
to disappear as well. Supporters of the club habitually frequented two cafes located side by side 
on the Cours Mirabeau. The first, the café Guion, known also as the "café de la noblesse," was 
the watering hole of former nobles and of officers from the Lyonnais regiment, stationed in Aix. 
The clientele next door, at the café Casati, was largely artisanal, though the municipal council 
later called its denizens "malcontents of various classes." The chevalier Guiramand appeared 
daily at the café Guion, sporting a white cockade, which he openly proclaimed as a symbol of the 
counterrevolution. He had reportedly commissioned the manufacture of dozens of these 
cockades, to be worn by the members of the new club. Guiramand and his comrades recruited 
those members at the café Casati, offering work to some and money to others while asserting that 
the principal aim of the new club would be to assist the poor. Aix had already experienced 
considerable emigration, and some claimed that the new club might bring back to town the 
departed aristocrats, who would, of course, patronize the now unemployed artisans of Aix. 
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On 11 December Guiramand and four others appeared at the town hall to register the new club, 
which was to hold its first meeting the following day, a Sunday. Rumors spread quickly through 
town, and by afternoon messengers were hurrying back and forth between the two revolutionary 
clubs in Aix, the Jacobins and the anti-politiques. Both clubs convened formal meetings the 
following morning and continued to exchange delegates. The two clubs met on opposite sides of 
town, and the natural route from one to the other crossed the Cours Mira-beau near the café 
Guion. It was there that trouble began. 
Witnesses later testified that each time delegates from the two clubs passed in front of the cafe 
Guion, Lyonnais officers rushed out to taunt them. Guiramand reportedly spent most of the day 
strutting about in front of the two cafes despite warnings that his confrontational posture might 
provoke trouble. Late in the afternoon the Jacobin club and the anti-politiques agreed to unite in 
response to the new monarchist challenge.
11
 To seal the agreement, the Jacobins walked en 
masse to the anti-politiques' meeting hall, and the two clubs returned together to the Jacobin hall, 
forming a long column as they marched back across town. As they crossed the Cours Mirabeau, 
they sang "Ca ira," and the Lyonnais officers greeted them with insults: "Where is that rabble 
going? Look at that rabble amusing themselves: I'll run my sword through their guts. I'll call out 
one hundred soldiers from the [Lyonnais] Regiment, and we'll wipe them all out."
12
 The 
chevalier Guiramand chose not to wait for the regiment. From the door of the cafe he fired a 
pistol shot into the crowd, and the confrontation of words quickly escalated into a riot. More 
shots were fired, and several citizens were wounded. The radical club members sacked the café 
Guion, and the Lyonnais officers retreated to the garrison. There they attempted to rally the 
regiment for a march back into town, but the soldiers refused to follow the officers' orders, 
thereby averting serious bloodshed. 
That night the municipal council ordered the Lyonnais regiment out of town. They left early the 
following morning and were replaced by the Ernest regiment from Marseilles along with a 
contingent of the Marseilles national guard. Those two forces, however, could not pre-serve 
order in Aix. On Monday militants from the two clubs seized the avocat Pascalis at his country 
estate, as well as the marquis de la Roquette, who had reportedly been at the café Guion when 
trouble began. Both men had previously antagonized Aix patriots. In September Pascalis had 
delivered an inflammatory speech at the closing session of the Aix parlement, a speech widely 
interpreted as counterrevolutionary. Since then he had frequently received visits from Lyonnais 
officers at his country home just outside Aix, and when he was arrested on 13 December, an 
incriminating letter from the émigré princes was found in his pocket. La Roquette had offended 
the people of Aix two years earlier, when his coach had run over and killed a mother and two 
children. The people guarded that bitter memory. For La Roquette, then, the personal and the 
political mixed in a fateful fashion that Hugo or Dickens certainly would have appreciated. 
Pascalis and La Roquette remained secure in prison overnight, but the following morning a 
crowd gathered once again and forced municipal officials, terrified for their lives, to release the 
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prisoners. The drama ended, as it had begun, on the Cours Mirabeau, with the execution of 
Pascalis, La Roquette, and Guiramand.
13 
Several aspects of this failure to establish a monarchist club in Aix stand out. The known leaders 
of the club were predominantly aristocrats or bourgeois prominent in Old Regime society. But 
they made an active effort to recruit from the artisanal population of Aix, relying on patron-client 
ties within the community. Nearly every contemporary source noted the importance of the 
aristocracy to the local economy and the deleterious effect that recent emigration had had. We 
have no membership list for the club, but among those who were arrested on 12 December or 
who visited town hall the previous day to register the club, one finds a fencing master, a glove 
maker, two joiners, and a wig-maker, all of them from artisanal trades that would have catered to 
an aristocratic clientele.
14
 We should also reemphasize the role in this affair of the Lyonnais 
regiment, an essential ally for those in Aix who wished to found a monarchist club. 
The response of the other two clubs, the Jacobins and the anti-politiques, is also interesting. The 
union of the two clubs did not survive the following winter, but the effort to meet a perceived 
challenge to the Revolution with an action stressing patriotic unity and public unanimity is 
characteristic of the obsession with conspiracy that both Francois Furet and Lynn Hunt have 
argued was a central feature of revolutionary politics.
15
 Also consistent with this notion was a 
later action of the anti-politiques. In January 1791 that club petitioned the municipal council for 
a prohibition of the wearing of masks at the upcoming carnival celebrations. The implication? 
Who but an enemy of the Revolution would want to hide behind a mask? Given the tension and 
suspicion still prevailing in Aix public life, the council willingly granted the request.
16 
Let us consider more briefly the situations in Perpignan and Limoges. As in Aix, the political 
situation in Perpignan was contentious from the outset of the Revolution. Perpignan had a 
population in 1789 of around ten thousand, a quarter of whom were employed in agriculture, 
perhaps half in artisanal trades, with the remaining quarter composed of bourgeois professionals, 
royal officials, and aristocrats. This last group dominated local politics both at the end of the Old 
Regime and into the first two years of the Revolution. The Perpignan elite were jealous of local 
privileges and unsympathetic to the political and administrative reforms initiated in 1789.
17 
Local politics quickly polarized in 1789, with "aristocrats" and "patriots" competing for political 
control. The Old Regime elite easily carried the municipal elections of January 1790, in which 
only some 300 out of an active population of 1,664 bothered to vote. Most "patriots" were 
excluded from voting by the property requirement, and the marquis d'Aguilar was elected mayor 
almost unanimously. The municipal council was dominated by nobles and moderate bourgeois, a 
group characterized by Suzanne Bazart and Michele Marce as "liberal royalists." 
18 
Adding to the political volatility of the town was an unusually large national guard-some 
seventeen hundred of Perpignan's ten thousand inhabitants were members of one of the 
seventeen national guard companies. The companies were themselves composed, and therefore 
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divided, along social and political lines, which hardly made them a force that could be counted 
on to preserve public order. On 1 May 1790 public order was indeed disrupted when a Jacobin 
club meeting was broken up by violence.
19
 While that disruption may have hurt the reputation of 
the Jacobins in Perpignan, it seemed to help them in the department at large, as several club 
members were elected to the departmental administration in late spring. One thus had the 
somewhat unusual situation of a municipal council dominated by moderates at odds with a 
departmental administration sympathetic to the Jacobin club. When the municipal council chose 
not to celebrate the 1790 anniversary of 14 July, a clear rift developed between the two councils. 
A final ingredient in the political ferment was the fact that the royal Touraine regiment, stationed 
in Perpignan, was commanded by Riquetti le jeune, Mirabeau's younger brother. Unlike his more 
celebrated elder, Riquetti was something of a royalist troublemaker, and his incendiary antics 
forced him to flee Perpignan in mid-June, later to be arrested in Castelnaudary and charged by 
the Constituent Assembly in November.
20 
It was in this context that a monarchist club emerged in Perpignan. The Amis de la paix formed 
in Perpignan in late October 1790, with several municipal officers prominent in its leadership. 
Immediately, the Perpignan Jacobins wrote to the Constituent Assembly denouncing the new 
club, which they claimed had attracted priests, former nobles, and former magistrates, all 
supporters of the Old Regime and demonstrated enemies of the National Assembly.
21
 The Civil 
Constitution of the Clergy had been particularly divisive in Perpignan, and this issue gained 
many supporters for the new club, whose early meetings reportedly drew up to six hundred 
people. Whereas in Aix the Lyonnais regiment was seen as an ally by monarchists, in Perpignan 
the Touraine regiment was viewed as an ally by patriots, perhaps because the departmental 
administration ostensibly had more influence over its actions than did the municipality. When the 
Touraine regiment was transferred in late August, in the wake of the Riquetti affair, Perpignan 
patriots felt vulnerable, since the politically suspect national guard answered to the municipal 
council. Heartened by this development, local monarchists took a more active public role, one 
culminating in the creation of the Amis de la paix on 26 October. 
Although opponents accused the new club of counterrevolutionary intentions and Vingtrinier 
asserts that Perpignan was one of the towns that the princes in Turin were counting on, there is 
no clear evidence in the archives linking the Amis de la paix to the émigré princes or other 
conspiratorial groups in France.
22
 The monarchist club concentrated its efforts in fact on the 
campaign for municipal elections in November. Monarchist candidates won most of the seats on 
the municipal council, in most cases winning reelection, but charges of fraud brought a 
suspension of the results and the battle then shifted to the streets. 
The Jacobin club and the Amis de la paix met on the same street, directly opposite one another. 
On the night of 5 December a shot from an upper window of the Amis de la paix meeting hall 
wounded ajacobin as he left his club. The Jacobins sounded the alarm, people poured into the 
street, more shots were fired, and the enraged crowd broke down the door of the monarchist club 
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with a cannon blast. Eighty-five people were arrested inside (they claimed to have been playing 
lotto!), and authorities seized a number of guns. The quick and prudent actions of departmental 
administrators prevented deaths in this situation, although rumors to the contrary quickly spread 
throughout France.
23
 Reports of the conflict reached Aix, for example, by 12 or 13 December 
and clearly heightened tensions there. In Perpignan this confrontation brought a rash of 
resignations from the municipal council, with the vacancies being filled by Jacobins. The 
political balance of power had shifted in Perpignan, and, of course, the Amis de la paix had 
ceased to exist.
24 
The founding of a monarchist club in Limoges did not produce a violent confrontation as in Aix 
and Perpignan. The Amis de la paix in this town formed both to counter the influence of the 
Jacobin club and to respond to the November 1790 municipal elections, which had seen eight 
Jacobins elected to the twelve-member council. The founders of the new club proclaimed in a 
pamphlet their intention to arouse civic responsibility in order to increase voter turnout, making 
reference to "the crowd scarcely capable of examining the truth," which had allegedly been 
swayed by Jacobin club propaganda.
25 
The Amis de la paix first met on 11 December 1790. Initially there was widespread skepticism 
regarding the intent of the new club, but publication of its prospectus quieted doubts somewhat. 
In this docu-ment the Amis professed their desire for open discussion, obedience to the law, and 
respect for the new constitution. In an obvious challenge to the exclusivity of the Jacobin club 
and the Société patriotique et littéraire, a club composed of individuals too young to join the 
Jacobins, the Amis made membership fees low and declared their meetings open to the public. 
The other two clubs soon followed suit, and all seemed resigned to a period of intense but 
peaceful competition for members. 
The Société patriotique was the first to abandon the status quo of uneasy coexistence. In a 29 
December 1790 meeting, the Société patriotique charged the Amis with the instigation of public 
quarrels, in cafés and on street corners, between its own members and members of the other two 
clubs. Those present voted to avoid public confrontation but to bring all grievances to the 
attention of the society.
26
 The Jacobin club, too, intensified its campaign against the Amis de la 
paix. As early as 13 December, the Jacobins had granted the right to all national guardsmen to 
attend meetings in full uniform, a clear attempt to recruit new members. Pierre Dumas, a club 
member and captain in the guard, soon led his company to join the Jacobin club en masse. 
Both the municipal and departmental administrations at first refused to consider the squabbles 
between the Amis and the other two clubs. As Jacobin club membership grew, however, the 
issue came again before the departmental administration, introduced by the procureur general-
syndic Dumas, whom we have just seen leading his guardsmen to join the club! In an undated 
December letter addressed to the municipal council, the Jacobins expressed their concern over 
reports of a nationwide conspiracy and rumored Amis de la paix involvement. They noted that 
clubs with similar names had caused trouble in Nimes, Nancy, Brest, and Lyons.
27
 On 28 
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December Dumas remarked on the coincidence of recent public disruptions in Limoges with the 
formation of the Amis. He moved that the club be instructed to dissolve and its members to join 
the Jacobin club to avert serious trouble, and the motion was easily passed by the departmental 
directory, the district directory, and the municipal council. 
The Amis protested this decision. They charged, first, that the local councils were biased, 
claiming that of the thirty-nine members of the departmental directory, the district directory, and 
the municipal council, at least twenty-three belonged to the Jacobin club. They also defended 
their club's attention to legal requirements and noted that the Jacobin club had been founded six 
months before the Constituent Assembly legalized political associations. They vowed to continue 
their respect for authority by complying with the dissolution order. Instead of dissolving their 
club, however, the Amis proposed an affiliation with the Limoges Jacobins in order to retain an 
element of autonomy. The Jacobin club rejected the proposal, refusing to affiliate with any group 
not already recognized by the Paris Jacobins. The Amis stood fast and defended their right to 
assemble by noting the continued existence of the Société patriotique. Faced with an apparently 
unresolvable conflict, the municipal council ordered the suspension of the Amis de la paix on 30 
December 1790. Not wishing to serve as a pretext for the continued resistance of the Amis, the 
Société patriotique sent dele-gates to the Jacobin club on 1 January to request a union of the two 
popular societies. Unification took place two days later. The Amis de la paix was dissolved, and 
its suspension soon became official.
28 
Perhaps because there had been no violence, however, the influence of the Amis de la paix did 
not disappear with the club. Its members allied with the royal Navarre regiment stationed in 
Limoges and even formed their own elite dragoon unit as an adjunct to the national guard, 
though by late spring 1791 it, too, was abolished. Still, former Amis de la paix remained active 
informally and in November 1791 succeeded in regaining control of the municipal council. Only 
in 1792 did Limoges Jacobins finally consolidate their domination of local politics.
29 
It should be clear from these three cases that although one can speak of an effort to create a 
nationwide network of monarchist clubs (generated in part by the Paris club), there was no 
consensus among those clubs as to how to achieve their objectives or even what those objectives 
were. All shared a principled opposition to the Jacobin clubs, but not all embraced the 
counterrevolution as a means to achieve their elimination. In the latter months of 1790, 
monarchists throughout France continued to debate whether to combat the Revolution from 
within or from without, by engaging in revolutionary politics or by op-posing them. After the 
violence in Aix and Perpignan, however, and the aborted royalist uprising in Lyons at the same 
time, no monarchist club (even those claiming to be "friends of peace") could escape the charge 
of counterrevolutionary conspiracy. 
In addition to these inconsistencies among the clubs' goals and tac-tics, there were contradictions 
between the clubs' programs and their published rhetoric. As we have seen, these clubs attempted 
to recruit a popular following either by appealing to already existing patron-client relations or by 
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offering food and assistance to the poor. Even as they did so, however, the monarchists 
questioned the ability of the popu-lar classes to participate intelligently in politics, as in 
Malouet's 1789 speech and the Limoges pamphlet already cited. An anonymous pamphlet, 
published in early 1791, offered the following advice to the Paris poor whom the Monarchist 
Club had assisted with food: "Do not involve yourselves in disputes that do not concern you; 
work, be quiet, do not riot, and we will do our best to help you." 
30
 The monarchists sought to 
secure the acquiescence of the poor, not their support or participation. Jean-Baptiste Gorsas 
raised this issue in an amusing fashion with an anecdote appearing in a February 1791 issue of 
his newspaper. A national guardsman of the faubourg St. Marceau reproached a friend of his for 
accepting bread from the Monarchist Club. "Oh well," replied the friend, "I may have eaten 
monarchist bread, but when it comes out it is patriot crap!"
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 The monarchist clubs across France 
may have gained some passive popular support through their appeals and aid, but it quickly 
dissolved during times of trouble. 
It is also worth noting here the contrasting relationship between the monarchist clubs in these 
three towns and the local military forces. In Aix and Limoges, the Amis de la paix looked toward 
the royal Lyonnais and Navarre regiments for armed support, whereas patriots looked to the 
national guard. In Perpignan the situation was reversed. There is no predictable pattern, then, but 
clearly each of these institutions or organizations -royal regiments, national guards, Jacobin 
clubs, monarchist clubs -were seen as vehicles for the mobilization (or control) of public 
sentiment toward the end of securing political power in local elections. Competing groups chose 
to make use of each of them as opportunities presented themselves, motivated less by ideology 
than by pragmatism. 
Although the monarchist clubs themselves disappeared very quickly, their brief appearance, and 
the public confrontations they often provoked, generated a pamphlet debate that focused not only 
on the legitimacy of the Monarchist Club of Paris but on the legitimacy of political clubs more 
generally or, if that legitimacy was accepted, on what the duties and limitations of political clubs 
should be. Clubs, not surprisingly, were denounced by their opponents for giving rise to fac-
tions, for contributing nothing to political discourse and a great deal to public disorder. Central to 
all of these pamphlets, whether they de-fined their topic broadly or narrowly, were questions of 
sovereignty, representation, and national definition. They flowed logically, I would argue, from 
concern over the issue of public opinion at the end of the Old Regime, over whether or not public 
opinion had a legitimate role to play in the political process. If so, how was that public opinion to 
be expressed and registered, and what was to prevent political contestation from deteriorating 
into political factionalism? 
32
 As we have already seen, that political contestation between rival 
clubs, or between national guard units and royal regiments, often did deteriorate into violence in 
provincial towns. And I would argue that those violent incidents, well known to the deputies of 
the National Assembly and widely reported in Paris newspapers, had an influence on the 
rhetorical debate that took place in the pamphlet literature.
33 
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The following discussion focuses on some ten to twelve mostly anonymous pamphlets, though a 
few have identifiable authors; nearly all are difficult to pinpoint with regard to date of 
publication. I do not claim to offer here an exhaustive review of such pamphlets, though I did 
examine every relevant title for this period (late 1790 through spring 1791) listed in the 
Catalogue des imprimés in the Bibliothèque Nationale de France. Nor have I surveyed the 
extensive royalist press from this period, that task having been ably undertaken by William J. 
Murray. Murray shows that by late 1790 royalist newspapers took as one of their principal 
themes the denunciation of the Jacobin clubs, often questioning the legitimacy of clubs in 
general. He cites in particular Mallet du Pan's August diatribe in the Mercure de France against 
"the Clubs, their tyranny and the audacious licence they have introduced in all aspects of 
government." 
34
 It seems, indeed, that the royalist press grew apace with the monarchist clubs 
themselves, though it long out-lived them. 
My aim here is not to embark on a sophisticated textual analysis of the pamphlets (which, for the 
most part, are not terribly sophisticated) but, rather, to demonstrate that issues raised by these 
clashes between clubs in provincial towns also resonated in the more abstract debates emanating 
from Paris. The pamphlets can be grouped around three themes, to be considered in sequence. 
The first group addressed its comments essentially to the existence of the monarchist clubs, 
either defending or condemning those clubs and their purpose. The second group of pamphlets, 
written chiefly from the monarchist, or conservative, perspective, leveled a general attack upon 
all political clubs. A third group, represented by a single pamphlet in this discussion, attempted 
to define limitations and responsibilities under which the clubs might legitimately operate. 
It would seem appropriate to begin our discussion with Gorsas, whose newspaper made constant 
reference to the monarchist clubs throughout the winter months of 1790-91. In his issue of 29 
December 1790, Gorsas remarked in passing on the recent violent confrontations involving 
monarchist clubs in Aix and Perpignan as a prelude to a series of questions addressed to the 
Monarchist Club of Paris. Why, Gorsas asked, when a society of friends of the constitution 
already existed in Paris, was a new club forming that fashioned itself friends of the monarchist 
constitution? Did this new group believe the Jacobins to be opposed to the monarchy simply 
because some of its members held republican sentiments? And what motivated the Monarchist 
Club's offer to subsidize bread, through certain bakers, for the poor of Paris? Would this not 
necessarily provoke ill feelings among citizens and against those favored bakers? Was this not, 
Gorsas suggested, related to other secret and suspicious methods employed by the new club in its 
search for members? In closing, Gorsas returned to his first question, asking whether the 
Monarchist Club's expressed support for the monarchist constitution did not in fact imply 
support for a purely monarchist regime in which the king would exercise absolute power 
independent of the legislature. In the absence of a satisfactory response to these questions, 
Gorsas concluded, true patriots would have no choice but to oppose the Monarchist Club as an 
affront to the law and to the nation, indeed, to the general will.
35 
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Gorsas reprinted a portion of this diatribe the following month, and before long an anonymous 
pamphlet appeared responding to his questions. Shifting scrutiny to the Jacobin club, this 
pamphlet's author asked whether its members could truly be said to be friends of the constitution. 
If so, what of their attitude toward the legislature that Gorsas so highly valued? Rather than 
respectfully honor the decrees of the National Assembly, did Jacobin club members not indeed 
criticize, even denounce, its decrees and decisions? As for the Monarchist Club's declared 
support for the monarchist constitution, did the constitution not place executive power in the 
hands of the monarch; was the constitution not in fact a monarchist constitution? The two terms, 
the pamphlet asserted, were inseparable. This pamphleteer, like Gorsas, closed with an 
expression of deference to the law and to the nation but also to the king.
36 
Another lengthy anonymous pamphlet, entitled France, Is She a Monarchy? took up some of 
these same themes. This pamphlet, too, appealed to the law but to the fundamental constitutional 
law of France, not to those laws recently enacted by the National Assembly. The author 
denounced the restrictions placed on royal power, which limited the king to a suspensive veto 
and denied him the right to initiate legislation. Under the name of constitutional monarchy, the 
pamphlet argued, the National Assembly had in fact created a government more democratic than 
monarchical. Appealing to tradition, the pamphlet's author called for a stronger monarch, one 
restrained in his power only by an Estates General that would convene periodically to vote on 
taxes.
37
 This plea was echoed in another pamphlet, printed by the Club of 1789, which lamented 
that Louis XVI had been reduced to "first royal clerk of the kingdom."
38 
The rhetoric of these two pamphlets harkens back to the debates of 1789 and before and is more 
strident and conservative than that found in most of the other pamphlets published at this time 
(but no more so than the rhetoric of the right-wing newspapers of the period).39 More typical 
were two pamphlets written by Stanislas Clermont-Tonnerre and Pierre Malouet, founders of the 
Monarchist Club, who wrote in response to Antoine Barnave's denunciation of their organization 
before the National Assembly. Clermont-Tonnerre clearly was concerned over Louis's 
diminished role in the government, but instead of appealing to tradition he attacked the growing 
influence of factions, which threatened to annihilate royal power completely. By factions he 
meant the Jacobin club, whose control over administrative bodies and the national legislative 
agenda had prompted the formation of the Monarchist Club. Clermont-Tonnerre described royal 
power as a national treasure, and pledged the efforts of his club in defense of the general will 
against factious elements.
40 
Malouet added his signature to Clermont-Tonnerre's work, but also penned a pamphlet of his 
own. He responded to Barnave's denunciation of the Monarchist Club's efforts to subsidize bread 
for the Paris poor, dismissing it as a scurrilous attack upon a charitable act. Malouet, like his 
colleague, decried the growing tyranny of the Jacobin clubs, whose influence he prematurely 
credited with extending to every town in France. This pamphlet also revealed another of the 
issues that had prompted the formation of monarchist clubs in recent months, the civil 
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constitution of the clergy, which Malouet denounced as "an appalling excess committed against 
religion and its ministers."
41 
Turning again to critics of the Monarchist Club, we might cite a letter from the Jacobin club of 
Brest (in Brittany) published in the 25 January 1791 issue of the Journal des Amis de la 
Constitution (the unofficial newspaper of the Jacobin Club of Paris). Alarmed not only by reports 
from Paris but also by recent attempts to form a monarchist club in Brest, the Brest Jacobins 
contended that no club should be allowed to form that declared its devotion to only a part of the 
constitution. True friends of the constitution, they argued, would support it in its entirety, 
whereas the monarchists seemed to be championing the executive power in opposition to the 
legislative power. It was the monarchists who were factious and divisive, not the Jacobins, and 
this would surely bring trouble, the Brest Jacobins observed, as it already had in Aix and 
Perpignan.
42 
Jean René Loiseau also lent his name to the attack on the Monar-chist Club. In a pamphlet most 
likely published in late winter or early spring 1791, Loiseau began by denouncing the 
Monarchist Club as an anticonstitutional association. The monarchists spoke of their devotion to 
the law, he argued, but had in fact voted against those elements of the new constitution that most 
favored the general interest. Loiseau observed that while the monarchists declared their support 
for the king, they refused to honor the king's acceptance of constitutional limitations. The 
monarchists wanted not constitutional monarchy but despotism, and Loiseau warned the French 
people against the folly of exchanging their liberty for a few pounds of bread.
43 
In this first set of pamphlets and newspaper articles, we see some of the same ambivalence that 
we have seen displayed in the conflict between monarchist clubs and Jacobin clubs in provincial 
towns. Given the events of 1789, would a constitutional monarchy prove workable, or should 
those who supported the king work to restore the absolute monarchy? If for the monarchists it 
was bordering on treason for the Jacobins to criticize and challenge the edicts of the king, for the 
Jacobins the monarchists' resistance to the decrees of the National Assembly was equally 
suspect. Both monarchists and Jacobins cautiously sought popular support to bolster their 
legitimacy, but in these pamphlets both sides questioned the motives of the other in that pursuit. 
Where did political legitimacy lie, and how were politics to be practiced? These questions lay at 
the heart of this debate. 
Our second group of pamphleteers, perhaps aware that in a de-bate pitting the Monarchist Club 
against the Jacobin Club the monarchists were doomed to lose, instead leveled their attack 
against clubs in general. The earliest of these pamphlets, titled Political Clubs and Libels, 
addressed the claim that clubs had been established to convey to legislators the influence of 
public opinion. But first, the author insisted, we must define "public opinion" (a task that 
historians are still struggling with today). Our pamphleteer had an easier time establishing what 
"public opinion" was not. It was not, he argued, expressed by political clubs, which, rather, 
represented particular interests deliberating in particular arenas. Legislators, by contrast, should 
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be concerned only with the public good in a National Assembly independent of clubs. To rely on 
clubs would lead France toward democracy, in which direction lay a despotism worse than the 
ministerial despotism of the Old Regime. The author did not call for the abolition of clubs but, 
rather, exhorted all honest citizens to desert the clubs in the interest of public spirit and liberty.
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Another pamphlet, titled What Do These Clubs Do? They Flaunt Foolishness and Rebellion, did 
go so far as to call for the abolition of all existing clubs. All citizens had the right to assemble, 
the author agreed, but in these clubs otherwise responsible citizens seemed to lose all sense of 
duty and accountability. Why should club members, who individually possessed no particular 
authority, suddenly acquire political authority as a group? Yet no one could deny that the radical 
clubs exercised considerable influence over the National Assembly and, indeed, aspired to be 
more powerful than the king. This pamphleteer saw the clubs leading not to democracy but to 
anarchy and for that reason urged their abolition.
45 
The other three pamphlets condemning all clubs focused principally on the issue of factions, as 
suggested by the title of the first, In Each of These Clubs There Are Many Different Opinions. 
The anonymous author described clubs as a cancer in the bosom of the state. The Jacobins 
wanted to conquer the National Assembly; the monarchists wanted to conquer the Jacobins; and 
the Cordeliers wanted to conquer the municipality of Paris.
46
 A second pamphlet contained a 
plea within its title, No More Clubs, Is the General Cry. The first two paragraphs are worth 
quoting: 
What is a club? It is a society of men who regularly assemble to discuss the affairs of state, to deliberate 
upon them, to act in consequence of their deliberation, to influence the public by their opinion, to hold at 
bay the National Assembly, the King, and all those agents of authority that appear misguided in the eyes of 
the club.  
If this definition is fair, the question is already decided: Every sort of club is useless and dangerous; what 
need have we of men who assemble in every town to deliberate on affairs of state? Do we not have a 
National Assembly, or do we need several? 
It is said, the author continued, that clubs help to form public opinion, but in fact they deformed 
public opinion. Calm and tranquillity are required for public opinion to form. Clubs aroused 
passions and produced parties and factions.
47 
Mallet du Pan took this discussion of factions to a more abstract level in a pamphlet titled On the 
Principle of Factions in General, and Especially on Those That Divide France. His text, replete 
with allusions to classical Rome, made critical reference to both the Jacobin Club and the 
Monarchist Club. He argued that the National Assembly had exceeded the mandate constituted 
by the grievance lists of 1789, and he was offended particularly by the legislation directed 
against the nobility and the clergy. He traced the tragic divisions in France to the ideal of social 
equality. Too many diverse political opinions had emerged in a country that, unfortunately, 
lacked a tradition of loyal opposition such as that of England. Quoting from John Adams, Mallet 
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concluded by suggesting that the majority within the National Assembly must itself be viewed as 
a faction, because it refused to tolerate the views of the minority.
48 
One of the pamphlets in this last group, though calling for the abolition of all existing clubs, 
allowed that legitimate clubs might form thereafter. These clubs should limit themselves, the 
pamphlet argued, to discussion of affairs of state and study of the laws and avoid taking action or 
voicing opinion.
49 
In these pamphlets too, we see ambivalence. All citizens have the right to assemble, but 
assembly in clubs tended either toward despotism or toward anarchy. Whereas one pamphleteer 
sees democracy as positive though not likely to be achieved by the formation of clubs, another 
sees democracy as despotic. One sees expressed here the fear of factions, a fear that would 
plague each of the National Assemblies up until the proscription of the Girondin deputies from 
the National Convention. Quelled temporarily by the Jacobin ascendancy, that fear of factions, 
and the refusal to accept the legitimacy of political parties, would reemerge under the 
Directoire.
50
 But if the only way to prevent factions was to deny people the right to organize 
politically, then how were ordinary citizens to express their views in an efficacious manner? A 
prohibition of political clubs, far from enhancing the free expression of public opinion, would 
seem like a prescription for the continued dominance of the social elite.
51 
Only one pamphlet among those I have found, written by Dessaignes de l'Oratoire, explicitly set 
out to define the rights and duties of clubs rather than to attack them. The destruction of clubs, 
Dessaignes argued, would be detrimental to the state. Clubs acted as safeguards for the nation's 
liberty. All the same, he went on, clubs should be subject to all the laws and constitutional 
limitations imposed upon citizens. Every club member should be responsible for his own actions, 
and clubs should be viewed and treated as nothing more than collections of individual citizens. In 
other words, the clubs should not be recognized as corporate bodies, nor could they legitimately 
act as such. 
The Jacobin club network from this perspective was unconstitutional, since the Jacobins acted as 
a corporate body in their efforts to influence the National Assembly and in their efforts to 
influence elections. This corporate spirit was contrary to the general interest, and it was against 
this corporate spirit that the Le Chapelier legislation of September 1791 was directed. Dessaignes 
viewed electoral assemblies as the only legitimate intermediaries between the people and their 
elected representatives. Echoing other pamphlets, he argued that clubs should discuss public 
affairs but did not have the power to deliberate. If clubs operated within these limitations, he 
concluded, they would be beneficial to society. Alone among these pamphleteers, Dessaignes 
offered a few final words regarding the place of women in political clubs. Their spirit, dependent 
as it was upon a delicate physique, was more suited to domestic than to public affairs, being 
incapable of dealing with weighty matters. Clearly, women had no place in political clubs.
52 
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What are we to make, then, of this debate over political clubs? There are several themes that 
emerge in this collection of pamphlets. We find numerous references to public opinion, for 
example, and several assertions that the Jacobin clubs did not in fact represent it. Keith Baker has 
observed that the increasingly contestatory politics of the last decades of the Old Regime had 
induced all sides to appeal to public opinion, thus making "the public" into an "abstract category 
of authority." But if by 1789 the public had indeed become sovereign, as Baker puts it, it 
remained an ill-defined entity.53 The clubs represented an effort to give public opinion a 
concrete form, but it was one that the monarchists clearly could not accept (except for those 
monarchists who formed their own clubs!). 
Mona Ozouf has written provocatively about the problem of giving public opinion a legitimate 
means of expression in revolutionary politics. The Jacobins in fact preferred the term "public 
spirit" (esprit public) to "public opinion," reflecting the predominant view that opinions were 
particular to individuals and must thus be overcome in pursuit of the Rousseauian ideal of the 
general will. To illustrate this point, Ozouf quotes a Directoire official reporting to his superiors 
that "there can be no public spirit where there are only opinions," and we have seen a similar 
sentiment expressed above in the pamphlet entitled Political Clubs and Libels, which urged 
people to abandon the clubs in the interest of public spirit. But educated Frenchmen of the 
eighteenth century also distinguished between "public opinion" and "common opinion." The 
pamphlet debate we have been examining reflects the prevailing view, in the midst of 
increasingly frequent appeals to "public opinion" in support of one position or another, that not 
all opinions were equally valid and not all French citizens should have the right to par-ticipate in 
revolutionary politics.
54
 This is also a view that we have seen explicitly expressed by supporters 
or members of monarchist clubs in Paris, Aix, and Limoges. 
A number of the pamphlets made appeals to constitutional legitimacy: They demanded respect 
for the constitutional power of the king; respect for the constitutional authority of the legislature; 
respect for the constitutional right to assemble; respect for the constitutional responsibilities of 
citizens. Yet the constitution had not yet been completed, and no revolutionary constitution 
succeeded in achieving enduring legitimacy. The pamphlet responding to Gorsas's questions 
aimed at the monarchists suggested that constitution and monarchique were inseparable, that one 
could not respect the one and not the other. But this was clearly not true. There had long been a 
monarch in France, but only now was a written constitution being drafted. Indeed, there was 
certainly nothing long-standing, let alone sacred or organic, about the constitutional monarchy. 
Far from being inextricably linked, as this pamphlet suggested, the constitution and the 
monarchy were in fact quite distinct.
55 
The denunciation of factions constitutes another theme of these pamphlets, but at the heart of the 
debate lay the issue of sovereignty and political participation, not factions. As Timothy Tackett 
has argued, it was the monarchists, the right, who first organized effectively within the 
Constituent Assembly in an effort to control the legislative agenda.
56 
It was only when the 
Jacobins began to use their clubs to influence public opinion and to mobilize electoral support 
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that the monarchists first tried to organize their own clubs and then moved to denounce all clubs 
as factions. We return here to the paradox of the monarchists forming clubs in order to secure the 
abolition of all clubs. They sought, in a sense, to marshal public opinion briefly with an eye to 
restricting what would be viewed as legitimate public opinion in the political arena. 
Political clubs, as the Jacobins used them, were a concrete manifestation of the desire, at least by 
some, to define sovereignty broadly and to tend toward participatory politics. By the time those 
on the right made a move to utilize the vehicle of clubs, it was clear that they were in principle 
traditionalists, opposed to the redefinition of politics then under way, and that their goal in fact 
was not to create an organized opposition but, rather, to undermine clubs as legitimate political 
institutions.
57
 It is striking that the appearance of monarchist clubs corresponded in timing to a 
burst of Jacobin club affiliations in pro-vincial towns. Affiliated societies numbered only 22 at 
the end of 1789. In June 1790 there were still only 91 provincial Jacobin clubs, but by September 
there were 152 and by year's end 276. The monarchist club response to that growth was too little 
and too late.
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Ultimately, what was at stake was the definition of the nation. Was it to be restricted to the 
deputies of the National Assembly, the representatives of the people, or was it to include the 
public as well? On the monarchist side the answer to this question was quite clear. They might 
appeal to public opinion in the abstract but only to exclude from political participation the more 
tangible, and muscular, entity "the people." 
As we have seen, this abstract and theoretical debate carried on in the pamphlets and newspapers 
of Paris had its practical manifestations as well, not only in Paris but also, and first, in the 
provinces. At the level of local politics, the practical problem of defining both sovereignty and 
public opinion became more viscerally apparent earlier than in Paris, and most of the deputies 
who would debate those issues at a later date in Paris had had some experience in local politics in 
the provincial towns that they had left behind. In some of those provincial towns, the debate over 
monarchist clubs had been of urgent, practical importance. 
What, then, was the impact of the monarchist clubs? I would argue that they served to polarize 
local politics in 1790 and 1791. One might argue that the Civil Constitution of the Clergy or the 
abolition of hereditary nobility, legislative measures that appear to have prompted the formation 
of monarchist clubs, were more important in polariz-ing local politics than the monarchist clubs 
themselves. It is difficult to separate cause and effect or to assign relative weight to each 
variable, but in emphasizing the role of the monarchist clubs, we might cite the situation in Caen. 
There a monarchist club never took shape, although the embryo of such a group did exist and in 
late 1791 produced what came to be known as the Affair of Eighty-four, an effort on the part of 
aristocrats to influence municipal elections. But this effort never progressed beyond the level of 
clandestine meetings in homes and cafés. No club ever formed. The effort remained, thus, at the 
periphery of Caen's political arena. Similarly, although the Civil Constitution of the Clergy was a 
contentious issue in Caen, it never became the explicit focus of competition between opposing 
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clubs. Because of this and other factors, politics in Caen did not polarize to the extent they did in 
towns such as Limoges and Perpignan. The formation of monarchist clubs, in other words, 
institutionalized and perpetuated political conflict that might otherwise have remained 
amorphous.
59 
Might the monarchist clubs have constituted a basis for a two-party political system in 
revolutionary France? That seems doubtful, given the clubs' own lack of consensus and the 
obsession among both monarchists and Jacobins with the threat of conspiracy and the ideal of 
political unanimity. Had the monarchist clubs survived until September 1791, they would have 
seen a part of their program realized in legislation sponsored by the deputy Le Chapelier (himself 
a founding member of the Paris Jacobin club) that "stated that no society or association of 
citizens could have an 'existence politique' and precluded clubs from interfering in the activities 
of government authorities, petitioning collectively, or appearing as a unit in public 
ceremonies."
60
 Surely the tur-moil caused by the monarchist clubs in Paris and the provinces was 
responsible in part for this law passed by the Constituent Assembly aimed at curtailing Jacobin 
influence. By that time, however, the jacobin clubs were so firmly entrenched that the law 
scarcely restrained their activities, and the monarchist clubs, of course, had long since ceased to 
exist.  
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Figure 1 Towns in which monarchist clubs appeared: Agde, Aire, Aix-en-Provence, Alencon, Alès, Amiens, 
Angoulême, Auch, Aurillac, Avignon, Bayonne, Bordeaux, Brest, Cambrai, Châteauroux, Clermont, Commercy, La 
Rochelle, Limoges, Metz, Nancy, Orléans, Paris, Pau, Perpignan, Poitiers, Provins, Sallies, Souillac, Strasbourg, 
Toulon, Toulouse, Tulle, Valenciennes, and Versailles. Sources: See note 3. 
